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CITY OF MONTICELLO | 
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vs. i 
LEE CHRISTENSEN, | 
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Case No. 89-0163 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGES BENCH, 
DAVIDSON AND JACKSON, ON DISMISSAL 
OF PETITIONER'S APPEAL 
Lee Christensen, Pro Se 
Petitioner 
225 Hwy. 30 East 
Evanston, Wyoming 
Mailing: 
c/o Norman Christensen 
965 South 15th East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
L. Robert Anderson 
Lyle R. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P. 0. Box 27 5 
Monticello, UT 84535 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction only to review the decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal. Because the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was not 
raised in the justice court or the circuit court, the Court of 
Appeals properly dismissed the appeal. If the Court determines 
that the Utah Court of Appeals improperly dismissed the appeal, 
respondent is willing, for the sake of economy, that this Court 
address the other issues raised by appellant, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the right to appeal from the justice court to 
the circuit court satisfy defendant's constitutional right of 
appeal? 
2. Does arguing in circuit court that "the State of 
Utah is not empowered to suspend what the State of Wyoming has 
granted" constitute challenging the validity or constitutionality 
of a statute or ordinance in the justice court when that argument 
was not included in defendant's written motion filed in justice 
court? 
3. Can the State of Utah suspend the privilege of the 
holder of a Wyoming license certificate to drive in the State of 
Utah if Wyoming recognizes Utah's right to do so? 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Interpretation of the following constitutional 
provisions and statutes is determinative of this case: 
Constitutional Provisions 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records and 
judicial proceedings of every other State. 
U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 1. 
In criminal cases the accused shall have the 
right to . . . appeal in all cases . . • . 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. 
Statutes 
A person whose operatorfs license has been 
suspended or revoked, as provided in this 
act, and who drives any motor vehicle upon 
the highways of this state while that license 
is suspended or revoked, is guilty of a 
crime, and upon conviction shall be punished 
as provided for in Section 41-2-30. 
Section 41-2-28, Utah Code (1985) 
"License" means the privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle over the highways of this 
State. 
Section 41-2-l(n), Utah Code (1985) 
The case shall be tried anew in the circuit 
court and the decision of the circuit court 
is final except where the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance 
is raised in the justice^'court. 
Section 77-35-26 (13) (a), Utah Code (1989) 
Except as expressly required by provisions of 
this compact, nothing contained herein shall 
be construed to affect the right of any party 
state to apply any of its other laws relating 
3 
to licenses to drive to any person or 
circumstance . . . . 
Article VI, Driver's License Compact, Section 41-2-502, Utah Code 
(1989) . 
The following is the procedure of the issuing 
jurisdiction: 
(1) When issuing a citation for a traffic 
violation, a peace officer shall issue the 
citation to a motorist who possesses a driver 
license issued by a party jurisdiction and 
shall not . . . require the motorist to post 
collateral to secure appearance if the 
officer receives the motorist's personal 
recognizance that he or she will comply with 
the terms of the citation. 
(3) Upon failure of a motorist to comply 
with the terms of a traffic citation, the 
appropriate official shall report the failure 
to comply to the licensing authority of the 
jurisdiction in which the traffic citation 
was issued. . . . 
(5) The licensing authority of the issuing 
jurisdiction may not suspend the privilege of 
a motorist for whom a report has been 
transmitted. 
Nonresident Violator Compact, Section 41-2-603, Utah Code (1989) 
(b) Upon receipt of certification that the 
driving privilege of a resident of this state 
has been suspended or revoked in any other 
state pursuant to a law providing for its 
suspension or revocation for failure to 
deposit security for the payment of judgments 
arising out of a motor vehicle accident; or 
for failure to deposit both security and 
proof of financial responsibility, under 
circumstances which would require the 
division to suspend a nonresident's operating 
privilege had the accident occurred in this 
state, the division shall suspend the license 
of the resident and all of his registrations. 
Suspension shall continue until the resident 
furnishes evidence of his compliance with the 
4 
law of the other state relating to the 
deposit of security and until the resident 
files proof of financial responsibility if 
required by the law. 
Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statutes (1973). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Defendant and appellant Lee Christensen ("Christensen") 
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Judgment and Order 
of Probation entered in the Twelfth (now Seventh) Circuit Court 
of San Juan County, Utah, Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding, 
on April 21, 1988, after a trial on March 31, 1988. Christensen 
was convicted of violating an ordinance of the City of Monticello 
(the "City") adopting Section 41-2-28, Utah Code (1985)1 on 
September 3, 1987, by driving a motor vehicle within the City 
while his license was suspended or revoked. Christensen had 
appealed to the circuit court from a conviction for the same 
offense before the Monticello Justice Court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction on February 23, 1989, City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 1989), and denied 
Christensen1s petition for rehearing on March 22, 1989. His 
At the time of the violation, the City had adopted by 
ordinance the Utah Traffic Laws in effect in 1985. Though 
Christensen was technically convicted of violating the ordinance, 
this brief will refer to the statutes incorporated by the City's 
ordinance. 
5 
petition for certiorari was filed and served on April 24, 1989. 
3 
This Court granted certiorari on June 12, 1989. 
Statement of Facts 
The City does not agree with Christensen1s Statement of 
Facts. Christensen has not furnished a transcript of the 
proceedings in the circuit court and the assertions in his brief 
are not evidence. 
Christensen1s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah was suspended for one year on February 5, 1987. That 
suspension was for failure to provide security for damages caused 
by Christensen, as an uninsured motorist, on October 2, 1986. 
Christensen was driving within the City on September 3, 1987. 
These are the only relevant facts. Christensen did not testify, 
nor did he call any witnesses. He was permitted to introduce a 
copy of his Wyoming driving record, which showed that he had been 
4 issued a Wyoming license certificate on July 17, 1984. 
Filing of the petition was due on April 21, 1989, according 
to the City's calculations, and filing on April 24, 1989, should 
have been refused pursuant to Rule 45(b) , Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
3 
For some reason, the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
requested the record from the Seventh Circuit Court, rather than 
from the Utah Court of Appeals, as Rule 48, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, would seem to require. 
4 
The City does not agree that Christensen had a valid Wyoming 
license, or that the possession of a Wyoming license certificate 
creates the presumption of Wyoming residency, as the Court of 
Appeals stated. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853, 
n. 1 (Utah App. 1989) . Christensen has never received mail in 
Wyoming since this case was filed, and his Wyoming address is a 
6 
There is no evidence in the record that Christensen 
challenged the validity or constitutionality of a statute in the 
5 justice court. His Demand for Dismissal filed in the circuit 
court argues that "the State of Utah is not empowered to suspend 
what the State of Wyoming has granted. ..." However, his 
Demand for Dismissal filed in justice court, identical in all 
other respects, does not contain such an argument. 
Christensen also asserts that he is entitled to special 
treatment because he appears pro se. In this connection, the 
City notes that Christensen may have qualified for court 
7 
appointed counsel, but instead filed a Demand for Counsel, 
demanding that he be allowed counsel of his own choosing, 
stating: 
Although the defendant fully intends to 
defend himself and has no need for someone to 
speak for him or to represent him, the 
defendant demands that he be able to have 
someone of his own choice to aid with counsel 
and other functions of trial. 
recreational vehicle court. 
5 
Reproduced in Appendix. 
Reproduced in Appendix. 
7 
Reproduced in Appendix. 
8. It became evident at both trials that the person of 
Christensen's choice was his sister, who is apparently not a 
lawyer, but a legal assistant. The City believes that the sister 
is responsible for preparation of all documents filed in this case. 
7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Christensen1s right of appeal was satisfied by the 
trial de novo before the circuit court. The validity or 
constitutionality of a statute was not raised in either the 
justice court or the circuit court, thus depriving the Utah Court 
of Appeals of jurisdiction. Christensen1s constitutional Full 
Faith and Credit Clause claim should not be addressed because it 
was raised for the first time on appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Assuming that the merits of Christensen1s arguments 
about Utah's power to suspend his driving license or privilege 
are addressed, they should be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CHRISTENSEN1S RIGHT OF APPEAL WAS 
SATISFIED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT 
TRIAL. 
Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution 
guarantees the accused a right to appeal in all cases. Prior to 
its amendment effective July 1, 1985, Article VIII, Section 9, of 
the Utah Constitution clearly provided that, for cases 
9 
originating m justice courts, this right was satisfied by the 
10 
right of appeal to district courts, except where the 
constitutionality or validity of a statute was involved. None of 
State v. Lyte, 75 Utah 283, 284 P.1006 (1930). 
10 
Appellate jurisdiction over justice courts has since been 
transferred to circuit courts. Section 78-4-7.5, Utah Code (1989). 
8 
the cases decided under pre-1985 law suggests that the trial de 
11 
novo before the district courts does not constitute an appeal. 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution now 
provides that "there shall be in all cases an appeal of right 
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cases." In this case, the justice court 
was the court of original jurisdiction, and the circuit court was 
the court with appellate jurisdiction. Christensen1s 
constitutional right of appeal was satisfied. 
II. CHRISTENSEN1S APPEAL TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
Section 77-35-26(13), Utah Code (1989) provides that 
where an appeal is taken to the circuit court from a judgment 
rendered in justice court: 
[T]he decision of the circuit court is final 
except where the validity or constitution-
ality of a statute or ordinance is raised in 
the justice court. 
Christensen contends that he challenged the validity 
and constitutionality of a statue in the courts below. However, 
the only part of the record remotely suggesting such a challenge 
is his written argument to the circuit court that "the State of 
Utah is not empowered to suspend what the State of Wyoming has 
11See, e.g. State v. Van Gervan, 647 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Munger, 642 P.2d 721 (Utah 1982). 
9 
granted." 
The Utah Court of Appeals properly concluded that 
Christensen had not challenged the constitutionality or validity 
of a statute or ordinance in the justice court. He did not 
identify any statute or ordinance as invalid, nor did he identify 
the constitutional provision on which he relied. His challenge, 
as far as could be determined, was actually based on the 
statutory interpretation argument that Utah could not suspend 
Christensen1s Utah license since he did not have a Utah license 
13 to suspend. 
Christensen1s failure to identify the faulty statute or 
the constitutional provision on which he relied deprived both the 
justice and circuit courts of the opportunity to consider and 
rule on a possibly dispositive question. The seemingly endless 
14 litigation that followed may have been avoided. 
Challenges to suspension of non-resident driving 
privileges based on the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection 
This argument to the circuit court was not included in the 
Demand for Dismissal filed in justice court. One must therefore 
conclude that this argument was not raised in the justice court. 
13See New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377 
(1977), cited by Christensen in his brief. 
14 
The City may also have decided, if the Full Faith and Credit 
challenge had been raised in justice or circuit court, to abandon 
prosecution of this case. The litigation resources of the City of 
Monticello are limited, as evidenced by the fact that its attorneys 
have acted without compensation in this matter since certiorari was 
granted. 
10 
Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause were all 
addressed and rejected in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 611 
(1915). Since then, the right of states to suspend non-resident 
15 driving privilege has been routinely upheld. As far as the 
City can determine, a challenge based on the full Faith and 
Credit Clause has never been decided. The Utah Court of Appeals 
properly deferred ruling on this claim until a case arrives in 
which the issue is properly presented. 
III. UTAH HAS THE POWER TO SUSPEND 
CHRISTENSEN'S LICENSE OR PRIVILEGE 
TO DRIVE IN UTAH. 
It is clear that Christensen*s challenge to his 
conviction is based primarily on statutory interpretation, 
especially in the justice and circuit courts. Even now, 
Christensen relies on a case from New Hampshire holding that a 
non-resident whose operating privileges have been revoked cannot 
be convicted of driving on a suspended license, since driving 
16 privilege and license are not synonymous. This reliance is 
misplaced. 
In New Hampshire v. French, the driver, a resident of 
District of Columbia v. Fred, 281 U.S. 49 (1930); 
Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp. 26, 176 A. 2d 66 (Conn. App. 
1961); People v. Matas, 200 Cal. App. 3d, 264 Cal. Rptr. 627 
(1988); State v. Harkness, 189 Kan. 581, 370 P.2d 100 (1962); State 
v. Dalton, 13 Wash. App. 94, 533 P.2d 864 (1975); State v. 
Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 (1983) review denied 295 
Or. 846, 671 P.2d 1176 (1983). 
16New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377 (1977) . 
11 
New York, was convicted of driving under the influence and her 
right to operate a vehicle in New Hampshire was revoked for 90 
days. The Court held that she could not be convicted of driving 
while her license was revoked because her New York license was 
not revoked, only her right to operate in New Hampshire. The 
Court noted: 
Other states have statutes . . . proscribing 
only driving after suspension or revocation 
of one's license, but . . . definfe] license 
to include "any non resident operating 
privilege." Our legislature may draft a 
statute similar or identical to the ones 
above in order to cover cases like-the one 
before us. The judiciary may not. 
The Utah Legislature has drafted such a statute. 
Section 41-2-l(n), Utah Code (1985), now Section 41-2-102(9), 
Utah Code (1989) defines license as "the privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle in this state." Section 41-2-28 can thus be 
restated to say that a person whose privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle in this state (whether or not evidenced by a license 
certificate) has been suspended or revoked, and who drives any 
motor vehicle upon the highways of this state is guilty of a 
crime. 
The rule of law applicable to this case is stated in 
Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp., 176 A.2d 66 (Conn. App. 
1961): 
Id., 117 N.H. 785 at 788. 
12 
Donald Roy, Massachusetts operator, by virtue 
of §14-39 is entitled to the rights and 
privileges accorded to Donald J. Roy, 
Connecticut operator, a person whose right to 
operate a motor vehicle in Connecticut has 
been suspended. Equivalent right does not 
mean additional right, and the provisions of 
§14-39 were not intended to be, and cannot 
be, used as a back door means of obtaining 
restoration of a suspended license. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prohibit a 
suspension of non-resident driving privileges under the 
circumstances of this case. Though Utah may not deny to non-
residents licensed by their states the right to drive on Utah 
Highways simply because they are non-residents, it ought to be 
able to, and indeed should, require that they comply with Utah's 
traffic laws. Christensen failed to comply with Utah's law 
requiring him to furnish security for damages caused by an 
accident in which he was at fault and uninsured, and his 
privilege to drive in Utah was consequently suspended. 
The very Wyoming statute cited by Christensen in his 
brief shows that Wyoming recognizes the rights of other states to 
suspend the privileges of Wyoming residents and license holders 
to drive in those other states. Section 31-9-204, Wyoming 
Statutes (1973) requires Wyoming officials to suspend the license 
Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp. 26, 176 A.2d 66 at 68 
(Conn. App. 1961) . See also People v. Matas, 200 Cal. App. 3d, 264 
Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988); State v. Harkness, 189 Kan. 581, 370 P.2d 
100 (1962) ; State v. Dalton, 13 Wash. App. 94, 533 P.2d 864 (1975) ; 
State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 (1983) review 
denied 295 Or. 846 671 P.2d 1176 (1983). 
13 
of a Wyoming resident whose privilege to drive in another state 
is suspended by that state for failure to deposit security, 
19 precisely the situation in this case. 
In State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 
(1983), review denied, 295 Or. 846,671 P.2d 1176 (1983), the 
Oregon Court of Appeals noted that: 
"The right of a state to regulate the use of 
its highways by nonresidents in order to 
protect public safety has been recognized 
almost fromQthe time the automobile was 
invented." 
but that: 
[W]e are not aware of any cases dealing with 
a full faith and credit challenge to the 
revoking state's authority. 
*
n
 Justesen, the Court declined to address the Full 
Faith and Credit challenge because both Oregon and Washington 
(the resident state) were parties to the Drivers License Compact. 
Citing Article V(2) of the Compact (found in Section 41-2-502, 
Utah Code (1989)) the Court concluded that Washington recognized 
the right of Oregon to suspend the Oregon driving privileges of 
Washington residents. While Wyoming was apparently not a member 
The City has no idea why this suspension by Wyoming did not 
occur. Perhaps it was because Wyoming was not then a member of the 
Driverfs License Compact and means for communication between Utah 
and Wyoming were poor. 
State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 at 383 
(1983) . 
21Id., 665 P.2d 380 at 383. 
14 
of the Drivers License Compact in 1987, its law clearly 
recognized the right of other states to suspend the non-resident 
driving privileges of Wyoming residents for failure to comply 
22 
with financial responsibility laws. This Court, like the 
Oregon Court of Appeal, need not consider the Full Faith and 
Credit question, because the Wyoming license certificate, 
necessarily limited by Wyoming law, was issued subject to Utah's 
right to suspend the appurtenant non-resident operating 
privileges. 
IV. NOTHING IN UTAH LAW PROHIBITS THIS 
SUSPENSION. 
Christensen cites the Drivers1 License Compact, 
Sections 41-2-501 et seq., Utah Code (1989) and the Nonresident 
Violator Compact, Sections 41-2-601 et seq., Utah Code (1989) for 
the proposition that Utah cannot suspend his non-resident 
operating privileges. Wyoming had not adopted the Driver1s 
License Compact at the time of Christensen1s conviction. Even if 
applicable, nothing in the Drivers1 License Compact declares that 
Utah may not suspend or revoke nonresident operator privileges. 
To the contrary, the Drivers1 License Compact specifically 
provides in Article VI that "nothing contained herein shall . . . 
affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other 
Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statute (1973). 
15 
laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance 
it 
Christensen asserts that Section 41-2-603(5) of the 
Nonresident Violator Compact bars Utah from suspending his 
license. There is no evidence that Wyoming was a part of this 
compact at the time of conviction. Even if applicable, a reading 
of the entire section makes clear that the report referred to is 
a report that a motorist has not complied with the terms of a 
traffic citation. In other words, a compact state may not 
suspend the driving privilege of a nonresident motorist for 
failing to appear in response to a citation, but must instead 
report to the jurisdiction of residence, which will initiate a 
suspension action. This section does not restrict suspensions 
for violation of traffic laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Christensen1s right of appeal was satisfied by the 
circuit court trial de novo. The Utah Court of Appeals properly 
dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. If the merits of 
his challenge to his conviction are reached, they must be 
rejected, because Utah has the right to, and properly did, 
suspend his privilege to drive in this state. The conviction 
should therefore be affirmed. 
16 
DATED this IQJU day of August, 1989. 
_^ —^ /r-t /r^^LA^L^ 
L. Robert Anderson 
Lyle R. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for City 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to the defendant by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, on the day of August, 1989, addressed 
as follows: 
Mr. Lee Hatfield Christensen 
c/o Norman Christensen 
965 South 15th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
<Li. A*h^-
lsy&& R. Anderson 
LCHRIS.BRF 
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Lee Christensen 
225I%30Rpst 
B/anstcn, Wyoming 
nailing 
C?0 Neman ChrlstaTsen 
965 South 15th East 
Salt Lake City , Utah 841Q5 
TO THE JUSTICE CF THE PEACE COURT OF MMTCELLO, COUNIY OF SAN JUAN, STATE OF UTAH 
City of San Juan, ] 
Paintiff ( 
v • ( 
Lee Christensen, ] 
Defendant I 
; DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL 
1
 Case No. 21786 
Comes now the defendant to demand that the charges in the 
above entitled case be dismissed against him. 
Defendant states to support motion, defendant is charged 
with DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, UC 41-2-28, as adopted by Ordinanc 
in the city of Monticello. This Code does not apply to the 
defendant. The defendant is not a resident of the state of Utah 
and has not had his Utah License suspended. 
Furthermore, defendant has now, did have at time of citation 
a Valid Wyoming License(Copy of Extract enclosed)., and is a 
residendent of Wyoming. According to Infomation, and Discovery, 
the prosecution is basing it's case on a letter from the Dept. 
of Public Safty, wherein it states that defendant's "Priveledge" 
is suspended. This only means that defendant may not have a Utah 
Driver's License until the time specified is over. Defendant has 
not applied for a Utah Driver's License. 
Therefore defendant demands dismissal of charges. 
Dated this 15th day of November, 1987. 
Respectfully Suraitted 
LEE OIIRIOTENOEN 
ORAL ARGUEMENT DEMANDED. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do certify that the foregoing Demand for Dissmissal, were 
sent certified mail to the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Lyel Anderso 
P. 0. Box 275, Monticello, Utah 84-535-
Lee Christensen, 
ii/n/87 
Lee Christensen 
225 hwy 30 East 
Evanston, Wyoming 
mailing- c/o Norman Christensen 
965 South 15th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
IN THE TWELTH CIRCUIT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, MONTICELLO DEPARTMENT 
CITY OF MONTICELLO, ( 
Plaintiff I 
V. i 
LEE CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant I 
j DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL 
| Criminal No. 88-CR-004. 
Comes now the defedant to demand that the charges in the 
above entitled case be dismissed against him. 
Defendant states to support motion, that defendant is charged 
with DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, UC 41-2-28, as adopted by Ordinace 
in the city of Monticello. 
Defendant is not a resident of Utah, but of Wyoming, and 
does not have a Utah Drivers license. Further, he does have, and 
did have a valid Wyoming license, which was ented into evidence 
in the Justice Court. 
According to Information, Prosecution is basing it's case 
on a letter from the Dept. of Public Safety, wherin it states that 
the defendant's "Privelege" is suspended. This only means that 
the defendant may not apply for a Utah Lisence until that suspension 
is over. Since the defendant is not applying for an Utah Lisence 
and since the State of Utah is not empowered to suspend what 
the State of Wyoming has granted, the defendant demands that the 
charges against him be dropped. 
ORAL ARGUEMENT DEMANDED. 
Dated this 22nd day of March, 1988. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
AlXhu<r 
Lee Christensen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do certify theat the foregoing Demand for Dismissal, as 
well as Demand for Cousel, were sent certified mail to the 
prosecuting attorney, Mr. Lyle AndersonP.O. Box275. Monticello, 
Utah 84535. ^ 
"4 HL QLAI tc<^<^ ee Christensen 
Lee Christensen 
c/o NormAN Christensen 
965 So. 15th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Residence 225 Hwy 30 East 
Evanston, Wyoming 
IN THE TWELTH CIRCUIT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, MONTICELLO DEPARTMENT 
THE CITY OF MONTICELLO, 
Plaintiff ) 
V. 
LEE CHRISTENSEN ] 
Defendant i 
DEMAND FOR COUNSEL 
[ CRIMINAL NO. 88-CR-004 
Comes now the defendant to demand that he be allowed coun-
sel, of his own choising. Although the defendant fully intends 
to defend himself and has no need for someone to speak for him, 
or to represent him, the defendant demands that he be able to 
have someone of his own choice to aid him with counsel and other 
functions of the trial. 
Defendant claims this right under the Constitution of the 
United States, and asserts that this aid is imperitive if he is 
to defend himself to the best of his ability. 
Dated this 21st day of March, 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
Lee Christensen 
